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WHY RESTRAIN ALIENATION?
Richard A. Epstein*
INTRODUCTION
In her informative article, Inalienability and the Theory of Property
Rights,' Susan Rose-Ackerman raises anew one persistent question that
has worked itself into the fabric of our general law: Why should there
be any restraints on the alienation of property? As stated the question
is an extremely broad one. The right of alienation, as part of the bun-
dle of property rights, is set in opposition to the rights of possession
and use. The types of property to which it can extend are real and
personal, tangible and intangible. Each type of property may be alien-
ated in a number of different ways, such as by sale, hire, mortgage,
lease, bail, or pledge. These various forms of alienation in turn may be
restrained in many ways. The restraints may be whole or partial; they
may be by common law rule or by public regulation; alienation may be
subject to an absolute prohibition, or it may be exercisable only upon
the payment of money.
As the possible range of restraints on alienation is very broad, it is
important to order the inquiry so as to exhibit its essential features.
This Article first seeks to explain why the right of alienation is a normal
incident of private ownership. Thereafter it seeks to examine the prin-
cipled reasons for limiting the right. These justifications in turn fall
into two main groups. The first set is concerned with the practical con-
trol of externalities. These may take the form of aggression against
third parties, the overexploitation of the common pool, or the exploita-
tion of infants and insane persons. Alternatively, restraints on aliena-
tion may be used to redress some asserted distributional weakness
within the present allocation of rights. My central thesis is that the first
justification is sound, but that the second is not. The proper office for
restraints on alienation is to provide indirect control over external
harms when direct means of control are ineffective to the task.
In working through this analysis I start from the assumption that
the core function of the law is to protect all persons and their property
against the force and fraud of another. There is no doubt in my view
that this simple view of entitlements between persons lies at the heart
of most of our legal system, both as it developed at common law, and as
it has come to be modified by statute. It is simply inconceivable to ac-
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count for the durable features of our legal system without reckoning on
the protections it affords against murder, rape, theft, fraud, and ex-
ploitation of minors and incompetents.
Yet today this system of rights is under attack from a number of
different quarters, chiefly by those who believe that all individuals have
(as against their fellow citizens) the right to some minimum level of
satisfaction for basic wants, determined by some collective means.2 I
believe that this alternative conception of rights is in error, but shall
not pursue the point here, except to note that no system of welfare
rights broadly defined seeks to jettison in its entirety the ordinary sys-
tem of common law rights. 3 The analysis of restraint of alienation that
follows is therefore not intended to resolve the tension between the
two competing visions of entitlements, but only to explain how re-
straints of alienation make sense within the common law framework.
The importance of the analysis for defenders of the primacy of com-
mon law rights is evident. Yet the inquiry also has vital importance for
those who believe in minimum welfare rights as well, so long as these
are conceived of as a supplement and not a replacement for the tradi-
tional common law conceptions.
I. WHY PERMIT ALIENATION?
As a first approximation it appears that any restraint upon the
power of an owner to alienate his own property should be regarded as
impermissible. The conclusion seems to follow from either of the two
theories that have dominated modern thinking about property-indi-
vidual freedom and social utility-assuming that we can distinguish
clearly between them. To the person who thinks of rights as being ac-
quired by first possession, the right of alienation seems to be an ines-
capable element of the original bundle of property rights. If alienation
is not acquired by the person who has obtained ownership by taking
possession of the property, then who else can claim it, and by what
possible warrant? The right cannot simply vest in the state by ipse
dixit,4 and no other person has a claim that is equal to or better than
that of the party in possession. To envision a system where A may pos-
sess and use property while only B has the right to alienate it is to em-
bed a complex network of bilateral monopolies in the original
distribution of property rights. As a routine matter costly negotiations
between A and B must precede the sale to C, who may in turn be unable
2. See, e.g., J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971); C. Wellman, Welfare Rights
(1982); McCloskey, Rights, 15 Phil. Q. 115 (1965).
3. See Epstein, The Uncertain Quest for Welfare Rights, B.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcom-
ing 1985).
4. I explore this theme in greater detail in R. Epstein, Takings: Private Property
Under the Power of Eminent Domain 12-13 (forthcoming 1985); Epstein, Possession as
the Root of Title, 13 Ga. L. Rev. 1221 (1979).
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to dispose of the property further if his own rights of alienation are also
qualified.
This labyrinth of rights is both unnecessary and undesirable. Most
voluntary transactions move property from lower to higher value uses.
The purchase price is greater than the value of the property to the
seller, else he will not part with it. Yet it must be less than the value of
the property in use to the buyer, else he will not purchase it. When
total transaction costs exceed the difference in values to the buyer and
the seller, then the exchange cannot go forward, since both parties no
longer will emerge as net winners. 5 The success in encouraging volun-
tary transactions therefore lies in the reduction of transaction costs. It
follows that any gratuitous proliferation of the number of necessary
parties to the transaction can only impede the frequency with which
these transactions take place, creating in the long run substantial losses
for the original owners. In addition, there are apt to be substantial
losses to third parties as well. Voluntary exchanges work for the mu-
tual benefit of both sides, and where these are restrained, potential pur-
chasers share in the losses that are held by original owners. 6 To insure
that exchanges can go forward, rights of alienation must be vested
somewhere, or resources will remain fixed in the hands of those who do
not want them. There seems no better place in which to locate exclu-
sive rights of alienation than with the parties already entitled to posses-
sion and use.
Surely matters cannot be this simple, for everywhere throughout
legal culture we find important restrictions upon the power of individu-
als to alienate their property or labor to third parties in voluntary trans-
actions. Many of these restrictions, such as rent control 7 and price
regulation of oil and gas,8 to be sure, may be the undesirable out-
growth of interest group politics, which works to the disruption of what
would otherwise be well-functioning competitive markets. Nonethe-
less, interest group politics does not supply the entire explanation for
restraints on alienation. The normative case for these restraints occu-
pies the rest of this Article.
5. More formally the relationship is as follows:
ifVb - V > T s + Tb,
then a voluntary transaction can go forward. Here Vb is the value to the buyer, V, is the
value to the seller, and Tb and T., are the transaction costs of the buyer and seller re-
spectively. The purpose of most modern real property devices such as recording stat-
utes is to reduce the transaction cost component in order to facilitate the exchange.
6. See, e.g., Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. Legal Stud. 321,
322 (1985) (stressing the importance of "closed classes" to facilitate voluntary
transactions).
7. See, e.g., Navarro, Rent Control in Cambridge, Mass., 78 Pub. Interest 83,
87-90 (1985).
8. Cf. Kitch, Regulation of the Field Market for Natural Gas by the Federal Power
Commission, 11 J.L. & Econ. 243 (1968) (discussing the advent of formal price control
regulation).
[Vol. 85:970
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II. CONTROLLING EXTERNAL HARMS
A. Prevention of the Improper Use of Force
One assumption implicit in the case for free alienation is that the
buyer's use of the property after alienation does not violate a rule of
tort or criminal law. The demarcation between legal and illegal uses of
property is a vexing problem for any legal theory. Nonetheless, for our
purposes, it is sufficient to assume that they include the use of force
against strangers. Once the class of permitted and prohibited uses is
defined, the question then arises, what is the best way to police the use
of property so as to bring about a world in which only permissible uses
take place?
One obvious starting place involves the law of torts, which gives
remedies in damages for harms that are committed, or imposes injunc-
tions against the parties in possession to prevent these harms from oc-
curring in the future. The choice between these two remedies is
difficult. It depends in large part upon the anticipated gains from the
actions in question, the likelihood that the defendants will have suffi-
cient funds to pay damages, and the ability of injured parties to identify
wrongdoers either before or after the harm in question takes place.
The inquiry does not stop with tort law, as there is still the further
question of how a system of direct regulation of use, either by fines or
prohibitions, can replace or augment the system of tort remedies. 9
The multiplication of possible remedial sets can easily stagger the
mind, but keeping our eyes fixed firmly on the nature of the enterprise
provides us with some guide through the empirical morass. The pur-
pose of the inquiry is to determine the costs of error, both of over and
underinclusion, brought on by the different remedial mixes directed to
an accepted goal. At no point can one expect a foolproof solution, for
so long as the costs of running a legal system are positive, some errors
in its operation must be tolerated. Even if the best mixture of remedies
is selected ex ante, a long shot may come home working injustice in the
individual case. But unless the disaster alters the estimation of the rele-
vant frequency and severity of loss, the proper institutional response is
to do nothing at all. If, for example, the best system of dam regulation
anticipates one major disaster in ten years, then its occurrence is not in
itself a cause to change the applicable regulations. Rapid institutional
shifts in response to immediate dangers hamper the operation of the
regulatory system, much as making insurance rates turn solely on past
experience precipitates enormous and unwarranted increases in rates
after the occurrence of a single accident.
This uncertain inquiry into remedial choices works itself back into
the question of alienability. Suppose, for example, it is concluded that
9. For a catalogue of the factors relevant to the inquiry, see Shavell, Liability for
Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 (1984).
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no effective remedy is available against the party in possession of the
thing because he is insolvent or difficult to locate, or both. Tort actions
for damages or injunctions quickly become impossible or at least too
costly. At this point the protection of third parties need no longer be
confined to remedies directed against the party in possession. Protec-
tion of third parties could demand that dangerous instrumentalities
never get into the hands of those persons whose conduct cannot effec-
tively be policed or monitored. Legal restrictions on alienation thus
allow an indirect attack upon improper use of dangerous things. Re-
straints on alienation may not be legitimate in most cases, but they will
be legitimate in some. Identifying which restraints are legitimate raises
the hardest questions confronting lawyers: How to make tradeoffs
under conditions of radical uncertainty as to the causes of social disor-
der and as to the consequences of public intervention? A few illustra-
tions show the nature of the problem.
1. Gun Control. - Gun control affords a useful initial example.
Guns are an instrument of aggression, just as they are instruments of
self-defense. The parties who have possession of them may not be able
to answer in damages for the harms inflicted upon others, while injunc-
tions upon their use are difficult to procure and almost impossible to
enforce, whether by private or public action. The remedies against par-
ties in possession are therefore weak. Accordingly, it may be that the
best solution is to make sure that these guns do not get into private
hands at all. To implement this proposal is to impose restraints upon
alienation, that is, upon the sale of guns.
The case for these restraints is complicated because all guns, and
all users of guns, are not alike. Note the relationship between three
broad classes of weapons: machine guns, rifles, and handguns. The
arguments in favor of restraint have proved decisive in the case of
machine guns, which cannot be owned by private parties at all. The
dangers of abuse are too great to tolerate, so that a prohibition on sale
is properly added to direct restrictions on use. Yet the outright ban of
machine guns need not necessarily extend to rifles in private posses-
sion. Rifles do not have the destructive capacity of machine guns, and
they have legitimate uses, like hunting, for which there is no obvious
safe substitute.
If the distinction between machine guns and rifles is sharp, that
between between rifles and handguns is far more vexing. Rifles cannot
be easily concealed and are thus less suitable for the commission of a
crime than ordinary handguns. Yet even here the matter is clouded
because at low cost they can be converted to handguns that are them-
selves often used for illegal purposes. If handguns therefore should be
banned, then an argument could be made to ban rifles as well. But now
the argument turns on empirical estimations of the private gains from
using rifles, and of the cost of their conversion into handguns.
I do not know enough about handguns to determine whether they
[Vol. 85:970
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should be banned, but this discussion illustrates why the debate has
been so pointed and inconclusive.10 The persistent question is whether
the regulation can distinguish between proper and improper uses at
some acceptable costs. Handguns have certain legitimate uses (e.g.,
target practice) that do not involve other persons. They can be used
for self-defense as well as for aggression. Their desirability is far
greater in certain areas, e.g., the western mountains, than in others,
e.g., cities. Some persons need guns to do their work; others are better
off without them because they are unfamiliar with their use. We could
try a system that restricted their use to certain types of persons, e.g.,
policemen and security guards. Yet the system is apt to be porous, for
guns are cheap and easily transferable to persons who should not have
them. The system of direct controls upon use may simply be too ineffi-
cient to serve as the sole source of social control.
The simple inquiry expands from its center. At a minimum the
legal system must ask who are the persons covered: all persons, all mi-
nors, all minors and persons with criminal records, all persons except
those in designated professions (the security guards, again), all persons
except those who qualify for licenses? Even after the class of users is
identified, the question remains whether that regulation can be evaded
by clandestinely importing guns from outside the jurisdiction, which
leaves the law-abiding at a disadvantage against the well-armed crimi-
nal with less respect for the authority of the law.
If direct restraints on alienation are rejected, then the possible ap-
plications of tort law may be invoked as a partial substitute. The right
of action against the user of the gun is sufficiently straightforward. The
hard question is whether it is possible, when the assailant is penniless,
to reach back against the party who sold it in the first instance, either
under the rubric of products liability or even ultrahazardous activities.
In general, a retailer who sells a gun to an infant may be held responsi-
ble for the injuries in question, typically on a theory of negligent en-
trustment. But there is great opposition to the idea of holding that a
sale per se is tortious when the purchaser is an adult."
The choice of sanctions is not easy, even if questions of politics and
special interests are put to one side. So long as the restrictions on use
are imperfect, restrictions upon alienation may make perfectly good
10. Compare N. Morris & G. Hawkins, The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime
Control (1970) (advocating gun control), with Restricting Handguns: The Liberal
Skeptics Speak Out (D. Kates ed. 1979) (opposing gun control) [hereinafter cited as
Kates].
11. See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding that sale of handguns is not an ultrahazardous activity under Illinois law);
Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 127 Ill. App. 3d 676, 469 N.E.2d 339 (1984) (manufacturer
of handgun has no duty to prevent its sale to persons likely to cause harm to the public).
But see Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983) (denying
summary judgement motion of handgun manufacturer who faced liability on an abnor-
mally dangerous activity theory for a routince sale of a firearm).
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sense, and cannot be ruled out of bounds by any per se pronounce-
ment. The mix of sanctions against improper use and original sale is
not conceptual, but empirical. And this empirical question is one on
which it is almost impossible to acquire reliable and systematic
evidence.
2. Liquor. - The framework of analysis extends beyond the gun
cases. Drinking liquor may not harm anyone but the user. But the be-
havior that alcohol induces in drinkers may inflict serious harm upon
third persons. Prohibition was a complex set of restraints upon the
production, sale, and use of alcohol, where restrictions on both produc-
tion and sale were designed to prevent such harm by limiting the
amount of use. But the case for limiting freedom of action is far more
persuasive when the protection of strangers (or even family) is at stake
than it is when harms are self-inflicted. Thus, Prohibition's major
weakness, especially as a constitutional norm, was that in preventing
the sale and use of a product, which some people abused, prohibition
also restricted the rights of many who enjoyed, but did not abuse, alco-
hol.12 Its constitutional repeal did not occur because prohibitions on
production, sale, and use failed to reduce the harms caused by liquor.
Rather, the nation was not prepared to pay the price imposed by the
enforcement of the comprehensive ban, including the sharp increase in
criminal behavior.
The repeal of Prohibition, however, does not eliminate the prob-
lem of social control. Instead, it forces us to think about more modest
systems of social control directed explicitly to third party harms such as
drunken driving. One set of sanctions could be directed against the
driver-for example, drivers can be frequently tested for drunkenness,
and heavy penalties imposed on those who are found drunk, as is done
in Scandinavian countries.1 3 A second approach is to apply tort (after
injury) or criminal sanctions (after arrest for reckless driving) to drunk
drivers. Intermediate strategies may also be envisioned.
Yet, as with guns, there is no reason to direct public controls only
to drivers who drink. Tort remedies might be levied against commer-
cial purveyors who sell liquor to persons who drive while drunk, as the
California Supreme Court attempted to do.14 Similarly, the tort action
12. The comparison between gun control and prohibition has been made by the
opponents of gun control. See Kates, Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the
United States, in Kates, supra note 10, at 23-24.
13. Compare Ross, The Scandinavian Myth: The Effectiveness of Drinking-and-
Driving Legislation in Sweden and Norway, 4J. Legal Stud. 285 (1975) (questioning the
effectiveness of these laws), with Votey, Scandinavian Drinking-Driving Control: Myth
or Intuition, 11 J. Legal Stud. 93 (1982) (defending their effectiveness).
14. A string of California cases established the basic patterns of liability. See, e.g.,
Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971) (en banc) (imply-
ing a private civil remedy against a tavern keeper and in favor of an injured person from
the California statute making it a misdemeanor to sell alcohol to an intoxicated person);
Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976) (en
976 [Vol. 85:970
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may also be allowed against social hosts who know both that a guest is
intoxicated and that he is about to drive. 15 These damage actions raise
important questions about the basis of the defendant's liability, and the
question of proximate cause: e.g., did the driver sober up?, did he ob-
tain the liquor from several different sources? As an institutional mat-
ter, however, it is possible to introduce direct controls on the sale of
liquor: no sale after 2 a.m., or to persons under eighteen, or to per-
sons who are known to be intoxicated. Risks of third party harms are
again controlled by restrictions on rights of alienation as well as rights
of use.
3. Narcotics and Drugs. - The analysis can be extended to deal with
a third case-narcotics and prescription drugs, many of which have ille-
gal uses. There is always a danger, especially with narcotics, that per-
sons under the influence will inflict harms on third parties, as when a
gunman under the influence of heroin goes on a rampage. Considera-
ble evidence also exists that a substantial number of automobile acci-
dents are caused by persons who drive under the influence of drugs,
although the empirical data is woefully inadequate.
16
Drugs and narcotics are also a danger to persons of limited compe-
tence, e.g., to children and incompetents, who are especially likely to
harm themselves by using them. That these people cannot protect
themselves justifies their protection under the law from the seductions
offered by strangers. One means of protection is to provide a guardian
who has the exclusive power to contract on behalf of the ward. None-
theless, wards are often able to form and perform agreements even
when denied the legal rights to do so. It is quite impossible for parents
to supervise their children's purchase of narcotics on the school play-
ground. Since there is good reason to restrict their use, it may be ap-
propriate to ban the sale of the substance to the protected class. But if
resales of dangerous substances cannot be controlled, then restrictions
on alienation to juveniles or. incompetents may not suffice. Broader
bans on the sale of certain substances may have to be considered
notwithstanding the obvious risks of overbreadth. The simple program
banc) (extending Vesely liability to a Nevada tavern keeper who advertised in California
and served alcohol to an intoxicated Californian, who drove back home and injured
another Californian); Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 534 (1978) (en banc) (extending liability to social hosts who serve intoxicated
guests).
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 25602(c) (West Supp. 1985) overrules these three cases by
name, showing an evident respect (and dislike) for the interpretative ingenuity of the
California Supreme Court. When the statute was attacked on state constitutional
grounds, the court declined to make its own common law rules on causation a state
constitutional requirement, despite its obvious misgivings about the merits of the stat-
ute. See Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d 430, 629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981) (noting
and accepting the legislative overruling of Vesely, Bernhard, and Coulter).
15. See, e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 NJ. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
16. See Belkin, Studies Weigh Hazard of Legal Drugs and Driving, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 22, 1984, at 30, col. 2 (noting lack of empirical studies).
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of restraining sales to prevent improper use by minors and incompe-
tents again leads to a myriad of institutional arrangements.
4. Speech. - The same problem can arise with the transfer of infor-
mation by sale. Suppose that someone wants to sell a book that de-
scribes how to build an atomic bomb. Here it seems clear that the
purchaser could be banned from building the bomb in question if he
had the information. But it is often far more desirable to prevent the
dissemination of information in the first place. Courts, for good rea-
sons, are very reluctant to impose any restrictions upon the freedom of
speech, given the possibilities of their abuse. 17 Yet in some cases, at
least, a ban upon the sale of information becomes part of a comprehen-
sive system for the control of the use of force.
B. Common Pool Problems
The second situation in which it often proves important to restrict
the freedom of alienation arises with common pool resources, i.e., in
those contexts in which one person is not the exclusive owner of a sin-
gle resource, but shares it in indefinite proportions with other claim-
ants. Whenever assets are held in common pools, there are dangers of
overexploitation by each of its members. The root of the problem lies
in the uneven match between benefits and burdens when something of
value-say animals or oil-is removed from the common pool. The
party who removes it receives all the gain from the removal, but only
bears a small fraction of the cost. The social costs from any given re-
moval may therefore be greater than the private gains of the removal,
which are in turn greater than the private costs to the individual who
removes it. That person responds only to his private costs, and hence
creates an external loss to others. The great risk to the common pool is
that every part owner has the strong incentive to remove something of
value from the pool, so that if removal is done by all, the common pool
may be destroyed, leaving every member worse off than he would have
been if some restrictions upon individual removals had been imposed
collectively.
The problem of the common pool does not have the obvious ur-
gency of ordinary aggression. A society could function if common
pools were left unregulated. Nonetheless the potential long-term ef-
fects can be extremely costly. The question therefore is how can one
best regulate the risks associated with overexploitation of the pool. For
that purpose, restraints on the right of alienation are one tool in the
comprehensive system of controls, one which can augment direct re-
strictions upon use. To see why it is important to restrain alienation, it
17. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per
curiam) (summarily rejecting Nixon Administration's attempt to enjoin the publication
of the Pentagon Papers); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (striking down a prior
restraint law).
[Vol. 85:970978
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is instructive to note that common pool problems can a-ise in two dif-
ferent contexts. They may be created among strangers by customary
practice or by operation of law, or they may be the outgrowth of a con-
sensual arrangement. Three areas in which the problem arises are
water rights, consensual limitations upon the assignment of contract
and property rights, and the prohibitions on the sale of voting rights.
1. Water Rights. - Flowing water is a valuable resource for which
there is no obvious single owner. Assuming, as was the case histori-
cally, that the Crown or the state does not own these rights by assertion
alone, then there must be some natural mode of acquisition that
matches claims to water with individual owners. One possibility is to
use the rule of first possession that establishes ownership of wild ani-
mals.' 8 But the consequences of this regime are simply unacceptable
because it spells the end of a river qua river. Flowing water has value
for navigation, for fishing, for recreation, for farming, and for irriga-
tion. To resort to the bankruptcy expression, there is little appeal to a
rule that would convert a river as a "going concern" into a stagnant
pool.19 In order to avoid this disastrous outcome, the first possession
rules had to be adapted to water rights to prevent the destruction of the
common pool. 20 The necessary restrictions are on use as well as aliena-
tion, and the overall design of the system only becomes clear when the
connections between the two are made explicit. In order to exhibit the
total rights structure, it is useful to organize the inquiry around two
questions. Who is entitled to be a member of the common pool? What
is the size and scope of each member's share?
The answer to the first question is straightforward. Under the
common law regimes of natural flow and reasonable use, the water
rights were in general allocated only to the owners of the riparian land,
so that possession of the land carried with it rights to the water. By
limiting the interests in the pool to riparians, the common law achieved
a solution with several very desirable features. The riparian require-
ment made it very easy to determine who was a claimant to the pool
and who was not. It also vested the rights in the waters in a class of
persons who, by virtue of their proximity to the resource, were apt to
value it most. To be sure, this riparian solution did not apply to every
use of flowing water. With navigable rivers, for example, the public at
large had a right of passage that no riparian could obstruct. Yet here
18. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805).
19. The use of the term and the analogy to bankruptcy is quite conscious. In bank-
ruptcy, the objection to a liquidation of a business is that the parts may not fetch as
much as the business is worth as a going concern. Deciding which firms to liquidate and
which to reorganize is a very complex business. See generally Jackson, Bankruptcy,
Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 Yale L.J. 857 (1982).
20. For a summary of the rules governing water rights, see C. Donahue, T. Kauper
& P. Martin, Property 322-59 (2d ed. 1983).
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too a simple rule determined who had rights and who did not: every-
one might exercise the right of passage.
Once the members of the common pool are so determined, then
the next question is: how much water is allocated to each of the many
persons who have access to the pool? "It is a fair participation and a
reasonable use by each that the law seeks to protect."'21 The formula
has a certain vague generality that is bound to invite conflicts at the
margin. But it also has a certain inner coherence that explains its dura-
bility. By stressing the idea of a "fair" participation, the law did not
foreshadow any principle of equal wealth among riparians, much less
echo some modem themes of income redistribution in society at large.
The owner of an extensive river estate did not hold his interest at the
whim of a struggling farmer, or vice versa. Instead, the idea of fair
participation guaranteed that no single person could appropriate all the
water in the river to his own use, thus destroying its going concern
value. By so providing, the law necessarily made the river into a com-
mon pool asset owned by a group of individuals who did not stand in a
consensual relationship one to another.
Nonetheless, administering a common pool asset is not resolved by
the simple negative declaration that no single riparian owns the entire
river. The question of shares remains. In a world in which direct ad-
ministrative controls are not in the cards, only simple devices are avail-
able for the messy job of rationing. Under the natural flow systems, the
tendency was to restrict use sharply, confining it largely to domestic
purposes. In the American "reasonable use" version, the law created a
rough hierarchy of permissible uses; domestic purposes first, agricul-
tural second, and commercial third, was the traditional allocation. 22
The priorities become critical in times of scarcity when the system
must ration an amount of water that cannot satisfy all uses. Here the
answer in natural flow systems was a pro rata reduction of use, which
was uniform across individuals, given that they were all in a single
class. 23 In the reasonable use states, the proration takes a somewhat
more complicated form. Proration is first applied to the commercial
uses, then the agricultural, and last the domestic. But within each class
all users are equal. This system of proration requires supervision of all
users simultaneously, and imposes potential administrative costs. But
there is no viable alternative. Since all riparians obtain equal rights by
virtue of their possession of adjacent land, priorities cannot be based
upon the time when water rights were first acquired, as is done under
the prior appropriation system dominant in the western part of the
United States.
Proration under natural flow and reasonable use has been attacked
21. Dumont v. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420, 423-24 (1874).
22. See, e.g., C. Donahue, T. Kauper & P. Martin, supra note 20, at 322-23.
23. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 850A commentj (1979).
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forcefully on economic grounds. The gist of the argument is that even
restrictions on water uses need not entail reduction in reverse order of
their value-that is, least valuable uses first. "Prorationing is an un-
economical principle of allocation, however common in many walks of
life. Cut back everyone by 25 per cent and some will miss the marginal
water very little, others a great deal." 24 But the objection is not deci-
sive, for it is not enough to show that the system is necessarily ineffi-
cient or unsound, without taking into account the costs necessary to set
things right. With water, the administrative costs in individualizing the
cutbacks would be enormous and subject to obvious abuse, given the
risks of rent-seeking that accompany any exercise of discretionary au-
thority. The rule, therefore, like other simple rules of thumb, is largely
dictated by the need to make decisions under conditions of imperfect
information. The fine points of marginal costs and relative value are
too hard to capture in the day-to-day world.
We are now in a position to establish the link between restrictions
on use and those on alienation. Note the ambivalent response that all
riparians should have toward alienation, given their own uncertainty as
to future plans for use. In one sense it is desirable for each riparian to
be able to sell water rights to those who will make better use of them,
since the two parties to that sale will both be gainers. Better use for the
buyer, however, may also be a more intensive use, which means that
any sale of riparian rights may diminish the correlative rights of other
claimants to the common pool. But there is another side to the coin. A
complete ban upon alienation is unlikely to maximize the value of the
pool, because persons who have little use for the water will continue to
draw upon it so long as its value in use to them exceeds their (trivial)
costs of removal.
The common law response to the problem steered between the
two extremes.2 5 Thus, the English natural flow system allowed the
alienation of water rights but only when tied to the sale of the riparian
lands. The landowner could not sell rights of access to the water to the
many who wanted to water their animals at the riverside. He could,
however, sell the land itself to a farmer able to make more intensive use
of the riparian lands, who could then have access for his own cattle. In
addition, under the older view of the law, the riparian could not expand
the land serviced by the water rights by acquiring land adjacent to his
own, for such a purchase would allow the owner unilaterally to increase
the burden he placed upon the common resource. The same uneasi-
ness carries over to the present day, but now the prohibition against the
use of water on nonriparian land tends not to be absolute, at least in
24. Gaffney, Economic Aspects of Water Resource Policy, 28 Am. J. Econ & Soc'y
131, 138 (1969).
25. Although the reasonable use systems adopted in the eastern United States vary
enormously, most of them impose some restraints upon the power of alienation. Fre-
quently, these restraints are not as strict as those found under the English rules.
1985]
HeinOnline  -- 85 Colum. L. Rev. 981 1985
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW
the United States. 26 The dominant view today seems to be that nonri-
parian uses may be allowed, even though they will be judged more
closely than riparian ones, again doubtless because of the fear of
surcharge against the common pool.
The differing responses to the questions of alienation and use illus-
trate the proposition that partial restrictions on alienation may help
preserve the value of common pool resources while permitting tied
sales that move resources to higher-valued uses. The common law sys-
tems were by no means perfect, but the same can also be said about the
more modem administrative schemes that have replaced them.
2. Consensual Restraints on Assignment of Contract Rights. - Con-
tracting affords the means for two or more parties to pool their sepa-
rate resources into a common venture. One question that frequently
arises is, who will be the parties to the venture after it is created? Here
both sides often agree that the rights that they have created under con-
tract shall not be assignable without the consent of the other. The rea-
son for the agreement is the fear of a shrcharge-of additional
burdens-upon a promisor should the promisee assign the right to a
third party. The promisee is a known quantity chosen and selected by
the promisor. Even if the legal system gives the promisor the same
rights against the promisee's assignee, the value of those rights still
may be reduced by the assignment. The promisor may not have any
informal leverage against the assignee, or the assignee may have a
greater willingness to breach in the hope of getting some collateral
gain. Preventing the assignment reduces the cost to the promisor by
fixing the content of the obligation that would otherwise run to an un-
identified party. Where the gains to the promisor exceed the costs to
the promisee, this arrangement will be in the mutual interest of both
parties. The other obligations of the promisor (e.g., the interest rate)
can be adjusted to compensate the promisee for the loss of the right of
alienation.
The contexts in which restraints on alienation make good business
sense are many and varied. In some instances the parties stand in
asymmetrical positions, as with a licensor and licensee of land. In other
situations they stand in 'oughly parallel positions, as with various per-
sonal service partnerships, where neither side relishes the thought of
suddenly being in business with a stranger. Where a small business
assumes a corporate form, the same concern with the identity of one's
business associates is expressed by limitations upon the right to alien-
ate shares without the consent of others. Where the business deal be-
comes more complex, the restraint on alienation may be partial or
conditional. Shares may be sold to family members, but not to outsid-
26. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 855 (1965). Comment b notes that
there is still authority to the contrary, and the fact that a use is nonriparian still counts
against its permissibility.
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ers; or they may be sold with the approval of the owners of sixty per-
cent of the other shares.
In some cases, however, legal systems go further and treat certain
rights over common assets as though they were incapable of alienation,
without regard to contractual intent. Thus the Roman Law of usu-
fruct-their rough analogue to the life estate-provided generally that
the holder of the usufruct interest, the usufructary, could not alienate
to a third party, but could release his interest back to the dominus, the
owner of the property.27 The reason for the distinction harkens back to
the familiar risk of surcharge. Release of the usufruct to the dominus
did not expose the common asset to a risk of overuse, for reuniting
both interests in the original owner extinguished joint ownership and
with it the common pool problem. Nor need voluntary transactions
stop with the release, for the owner always could create a new usufruct
in a third person of his own choosing. If the two transactions were
viewed as part of a unified plan, then the Roman rules allowed (to use
common law terms) the transfer of the life estate with the consent of
the reversioner, who then could control the identity of the new entrant
in order to reduce the likelihood of waste. In contrast, direct aliena-
tions between old and new usufructaries did create the risk that the
owner would be prejudiced by a more intensive or destructive use by
the new party in possession, against which actions for waste, brought
after the fact, may have provided inadequate protection.
The problem was not unique to the Romans. It occurs whenever a
tenant wants to sublet an apartment over the summer vacation. The
landlord wants to protect his reversion against abuse by the new tenant
in possession, and may only be imperfectly protected by the desire of
the tenant to protect his short-term interest in the premises.
The distinction between release to the owner and a transfer to a
third party has much to commend it. But it does not necessarily justify
a flat prohibition against third party transfers. The usufructary and the
owner were not strangers, and if they wished to arrange their transac-
tions to allow the usufruct the free alienation of the ususfructary's lim-
ited interest, then why prevent them from doing so? In principle, the
limitation on alienation imposed by the law might be presumptive only,
subject to contrary language in the original instrument. Nonetheless, it
is easy to underestimate the complexities of contracting out. One risk
is that the original owner may predecease the usufructary who then
must deal with a stranger to the original transaction. Another is that
written evidence may have been hard to come by, especially in Roman
times when lives were of uncertain length. The total prohibition may
have been preferable to the contract solution because of the ease of its
operation. Its resulting inflexibility was of relatively small moment,
27. See Gaius, Institutes, II, 30.
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given the unlikelihood that the parties would choose to grant the
usufructary free rights of alienation, even if allowed by law.
The same pattern emerges in the common law as well. The domi-
nant English rule is that easements in gross are generally inalienable, so
that any effort to create one results only in a license between the par-
ties.28 The fear is that the free transfer of the easement to a third party
will impose a surcharge against the owner of the burdened land. Yet
again there is some question whether the prohibition is necessary to
protect the interest of the landowner; registration systems can give no-
tice to the world of the state of the title,29 while contractual provisions,
which are cheaper to draft than in earlier times, may be able to control
the risk of surcharge in the event of transfer. Thus, the case for re-
straining alienation in consensual situations has weakened in modern
times.
3. Voting Rights. - The same analysis can be extended to the sale
of voting rights, which is generally restricted or prohibited. The prob-
lem arises both in corporate and political contexts.
a. Corporate Voting. - Corporate charters often place consensual
restrictions upon the alienation of shares. In addition, the sale of the
voting rights apart from their underlying shares is usually prohibited by
statute,30 much as the common law prohibits the naked sale of riparian
rights. Understanding these restrictions again depends upon the com-
mon pool problems that arise because assets have been placed into cor-
porate formations. As in the water rights case, the key risk is that
directors and officers of the corporation will divert corporate property
to their private use, suffering only a portion of the corporate loss and
reaping all the private gain. Other investors will not place money into
the corporate solution if they know it can be removed under systemati-
cally unfavorable terms. To raise capital, then, the corporate or-
ganizers must protect new investors against the possibility of looting.31
Indeed, much of the law of both public and private corporations is
28. SeeJ. Dukeminier &J. Krier, Property 963 (1981). For an attack on the rule,
see Sturley, Easements in Gross, 96 Law Q. Rev. 557 (1980).
29. See Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1353 (1982).
30. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 609(e) (McKinney 1984). Professors Easter-
brook and Fischel note: "There are a number of statutory limits on the ability of firms to
create the voting structures they prefer. For example, although investors may sell their
votes by selling the instruments to which the votes are attached, they may not sell the
vote independent of the instrument." Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law,
26 J.L. & Econ. 395, 400 (1983).
31. See id. at 410-11. The authors conduct a similar analysis by stressing the
agency costs complications that are raised when shares have different voting rights. The
point helps explain why public companies tend to have very simple capital structures,
while private corporations, which can take into account differences in position, have
more complex structures. Thus one common arrangement gives the older generation
preferred shares and the incoming generation common shares, in an effort to match risk
with control.
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designed to counter that abuse, whether it manifests itself in the form
of outright theft, or in subtle forms of favoritism for the control group.
One set of controls is directed towards the behavior of the parties
in power. Contracts of incorporation normally will impose fiduciary
duties upon the directors and officers of the corporation. They may be
restricted from acts of self-dealing or be required to treat all sharehold-
ers in a nondiscriminatory fashion. Yet these rules cannot be drawn
with sufficient precision to prevent key officers from being paid exces-
sive salaries or from padding expenses. Nor are such restrictions nec-
essarily desirable if they hinder the ability of directors and officers to
enter into new businesses or to abandon unprofitable ones.
Since the direct remedies against abuses by officers and directors
are imperfect, there are occasions where they may be usefully supple-
mented by restrictions upon the rights of alienation. Begin with the
hypothetical case where the charter of incorporation allows votes to be
sold independent of their underlying shares. Under this regime it will
be difficult to value the shares without the votes and the votes without
the shares. The value of the vote depends in large measure upon the
question of whether one person has obtained sufficient votes to hold a
veto or control position over corporate decisions. That position in turn
could be exercised to permit the diversion of corporate assets to private
use. Even if the seller of votes has confidence that his buyer will not
misbehave, there is no guarantee that abuses will not occur after resale.
Transactions in votes alone invite schemes that result in the redistribu-
tion of wealth, but not in wealth's production. Ex ante there is no obvi-
ous group favoring a solution that permits free alienation of votes
without the underlying shares. The reason for the restriction of this
practice by agreement seems clear. The prohibition by statute is far
more debatable, yet this restraint has caused so little controversy pre-
cisely because it does not block any sensible voluntary transaction.
The situation becomes more complex when the question is
whether to impose by agreement restraints on the alienation of shares.
It is highly doubtful that people could be led to invest in public corpo-
rations if they did not have the right of exit. This compromise solution,
that votes may be sold with shares, helps reduce the risk of the diver-
sion of common pool assetsjust as it does when the sale of water rights
is tied to the sale of riparian lands. It now takes more capital to acquire
the shares, and there is less apt to be the fatal mismatch between shares
and voting rights that invites abuse. Efforts to prevent such a mismatch
have led to a concern at common law with both voting trusts and irrevo-
cable proxies, precisely because they tend to separate votes from
shares.3 2 This concern also lies behind the traditional rules of public
32. For example, proxies must be revocable unless coupled with an interest. See,
e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 609 (McKinney 1984). Thus they may be revoked by the
issuance of a later proxy. Voting trusts (a pooling arrangement whereby shares under
separate ownership were voted by a trustee in accordance with prior instructions) were
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exchanges that prohibit multiple classes of voting common stock.33 In-
deed, much of the concern with corporate raiders arises from the fear
of corporate looting, although it seems probable that other safeguards
against looting and abuse are powerful enough that efforts of manage-
ment to prevent the sale, when not authorized by charter provision,
should always be looked on with deep suspicion.3 4
Nonetheless, the balance of convenience may shift dramatically in
private corporations, where the identity of the shareholders is often
critical. The power to vote still influences the control of the corpora-
tion, which in turn influences the distribution of the gains and losses
from the use of corporate assets. Yet the small number of relevant par-
ties may make it easier to create a fatal shift in the desired balance of
control. The restriction on the right of alienation thus can operate as
the first line of defense against corporate abuse. With five equal and
independent shareholders, for example, there is a clear risk in allowing
any one shareholder to purchase the interests of two others. (To make
the point more dramatic, assume that all shareholders obtained their
interest by inheritance, so that there is no contract to govern their in-
terpersonal relations.) Armed with sixty percent of the shares, this ma-
jority control would open additional opportunities for diversion of
corporate assets.3 5 To guard against this risk, it is often provided that
the sale of shares must be made to the corporation, where the domi-
nant effect is to insure that the sale does not distort the relative posi-
tions of the remaining equity holders in the firm. Yet even here the
rule is far from perfect, because even the corporate buyback may sud-
denly promote one shareholder to a fifty percent controlling interest.
prohibited at common law, and when allowed by statutes are hedged in by limitations
upon their duration that required periodic renewals of the trustee's powers. Easter-
brook & Fischel, supra note 30, at 400.
33. The question of multiple class stocks arises with new urgency in the modern
takeover battles where management seeks to use a second class of voting common to
ward off hostile takeover bids. These shares are generally distributed to persons
friendly to management and clearly diminish the worth of the outstanding shares of
common. See, e.g., Unequal Rights in Voting Stock, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1985, at D2,
col. 1. Note that these new issues of special voting common would never take place if
their distribution had to be made pro rata to all shareholders. Their skewed distribution
is thus evidence of rent-seeking in the corporate context and its usual negative-sum
consequence.
34. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981).
35. More formally the case is as follows. In a well-run corporation one tries to
maximize the profits of the whole to maximize the profits for each shareholder. Yet if
one shareholder has 60% of the stock, he can try to increase his effective share, so long
as (0.60 + x) (V*) > 0.60V, where Vis the value of the firm when run efficiently and V*
its value as reduced by conflicts of interest. If x, the percentage gain to the majority, is
very large it could pay for the majority to make V* quite small. If that is the case then
the minority shareholders take it on the chin both ways, as (0.40 - x)V* < 0.40V, pro-
ducing a net loss. The organizers of the corporation have an incentive to minimize this
loss at the outset in order to attract investors.
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The variations in the control patterns are many, especially when
supermajorities are required to take certain kinds of corporate actions.
Nonetheless, the corporate situation illustrates the central thesis that by
common practice, restraints on alienation have been used as safeguards
against the improper use of corporate control.
b. Public Elections. - The restraints on alienation found in the cor-
porate context shed some light upon the well-nigh universal prohibi-
tion against the sale of votes in public elections. It is important to
stress that a public office is indeed a public trust, so that elected offi-
cials, like corporate officials, have fiduciary duties. In addition, the
Constitution contains certain explicit limitations on government power
that are well understood as efforts to control the abuse of factions.36
But these restrictions, even if properly construed, still leave room for
patronage abuse, since public goods, from national defense to sewer
repair, must be provided by private contracts. As with close corpora-
tions, there is no easy entry and exit from thejurisdiction. Accordingly,
some steps must be taken to see that elections of public officials are not
a prelude to ruinous taxation or the plundering of the public treasury.
The question, then, is how to constrain voting rights given that
other controls against the abuse of public power are imperfect. The
original tendency to limit voting rights to property holders was a re-
sponse to the fear of confiscation if propertyless individuals should ob-
tain control over the powers to tax and regulate. The analogy is that,
just as only shareholders can vote in corporate elections, so only prop-
erty holders were entitled to vote in political ones. The injustice in this
restriction was, of course, that persons without property nonetheless
had a stake in the community and were bound by its laws. Nonetheless,
the concern to limit the franchise still finds voice today in durational
residence requirements, just as only riparians have water rights. Small
towns watch uneasily when relatively transient college students gain
control over local institutions. (The problem with the Raj Neesh in Or-
egon, who has imported residents to his commune, is even more obvi-
ous.) The people who pay local taxes will not willingly cede power to
outsiders, even though it is well understood that local decisions will
have important external effects.
Eligibility requirements are only one restriction on the right to
vote. The fear of confiscation and worse also underlies the continued
prohibition upon the sale of votes. Why would one want to purchase a
vote? The most probable answer is to obtain control of the public ma-
chinery in ways that allow a person to recover, at the very least, the
36. For two very different views of these constraints, compare Epstein, Toward a
Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 703 (1984) (constraints like
contract clause designed to shrink sphere of government activity and thus preclude leg-
islative preoccupations with certain areas of factional dispute), with Sunstein, Naked
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689 (1984) (constraints designed
to prevent the exercise of raw political power by one group over another).
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money that was paid out to the individuals who sold their votes, with
something left to compensate the buyer for the labor and en-
trepreneurial risk. If vote selling were fully legal, there would be no
reason to limit sales to ones for hard cash, for individuals could make
(secured) promises to make payments from the public treasury after
election. Vote buyers would finance their purchases out of the pockets
of third parties. Prohibiting the sale of votes is thus a low-cost way of
preventing these extreme forms of abuse.
To be sure, the prohibition against selling votes is by no means
perfect. Some vote selling can take place outside the shadow of the law.
In addition, political candidates can run for public office by making
general promises that are akin to the purchase of votes: there are the
standard campaign promises of favorable treatment, be it domestic
content legislation for automobile manufacturers and workers, subsi-
dies for farmers, retraining grants for displaced workers, or increases in
social security. I do not wish to condone any of these devices; indeed, I
would support a workable system of constitutional restrictions on the
power to dole out subsidies to interest groups. But that system is most
assuredly not in place today. A simple restriction on selling votes
should not be disparaged even if it does not offer a complete answer to
the problem of political abuse. As with water rights, some restrictions
against alienation may be desirable in order to prevent dissipation and
expropriation of common pool assets.
III. A NOTE ON DISTRmBUTION
I now turn to the use of restraints on alienation to pursue distribu-
tional goals. The justifications for general wealth distribution lie
outside the focus on common law rules of this Article. It is important,
however, to address the question of means to distributive ends. My
basic position is that if the ends are proper, then they are best achieved
through taxation, which at least has the rough virtue of working redis-
tributions from rich to poor. The relative case for redistribution
through taxation is reinforced by noting the odd results that occur
when alienation rules are used to achieve that end. In order to make
the point here, I take only three examples discussed in Professor Rose-
Ackerman's paper: the sale of blood, homesteading, and voting
rights. 37
I think that a good deal can be said for limiting the sale of blood in
order to control the problem of fraud when there is no effective way to
distinguish between good and bad blood. But I do not see why any
distributional argument is sufficiently powerful to overcome the very
real efficiency losses that, as Professor Rose-Ackerman demonstrates,
follow from the free distribution of blood, purchased of course with the
37. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 1, at 945-49, 957-63, 966-67.
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tax dollars of others.a8 Where there is a workable charitable market,
the system of coerced subsidies seems unattractive. A fortiori, I can
think of no more unlikely place for regulation than in organ trans-
plants. If two cousins cannot work out their differences, no system of
direct public controls will handle the bilateral monopoly problem.3 9
Similarly, I am very uneasy about the distributive arguments that
Professor Rose-Ackerman makes in favor of homesteading laws. 40 To
be sure, there may be some difficulty in getting isolated individuals to
settle in the plains, but this hardly justifies the set of inefficient rules
that, in sharp opposition to the first possession rules at common law,
required individuals to remain on their claims indefinitely in order to
perfect title. It seems likely that some less restrictive alternative could
have met the joint demands of national security and efficient land use.
For example, the government could have sold off the lands in large
plots (say several square miles or more) to speculators who thereafter
would have to internalize all the costs of letting the land go into use
slowly. These speculators would then have had the proper incentives
to experiment with different terms of sale, including sales of variable
plot sizes, to take into account the subtle differences in local conditions.
National security could have been furthered by erecting forts at strate-
gic locations, or even by a simple condition that the large land plots be
occupied by some minimum number of persons. In fact, the severe re-
strictions of the homesteading laws might well have discouraged settle-
ment in the first place.
The same arguments can be extended to voting. One might argue
that restrictions on the right to sell votes are designed to prevent ex-
ploitation of the poor, who might be induced to part with their vote for
a song. But the argument seems misguided on both historical and the-
oretical grounds. Historically, the prohibition against selling votes ex-
isted even when a property requirement explicitly barred the poor from
the franchise. The fear of rent-seeking and intrigue more effectively
explain why the prohibition remains than does the concern with ex-
ploitation. In addition, it is difficult to see why exploitation should oc-
cur. Between a buyer and seller of votes there is no obvious
externality, and no reason why the poor vote holder could not com-
mand a fairly attractive sum for the vote in question, especially when
rival factions are bidding for control. Here, too, the distributional con-
sequences are uncertain and uninformative, while the dangers of de-
stroying the public and private wealth are manifest. Ad hoc
distributional arguments introduce a jarring note into the analysis by
38. See id. at 945-49.
39. See id. at 949.
40. This theme has become commonplace in the literature. See Heiner, The Origin
of Predictable Behavior, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 560 (1983); Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and
the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. Legal Stud. 13 (1985).
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allowing us to justify restraints on alienation that unwisely go beyond
the need to control for external harms and common pool problems.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article was to explain why restraints upon
alienation persist in a world in which a sale of assets is generally a wel-
come event. Rules restraining alienation are best accounted for, both
positively and normatively, by the need to control problems of external
harm and the common pool. In essence the restraint on alienation is a
substitute for direct remedies for misuse when these are costly and un-
certain to administer. In speaking of the restraints upon alienation it is
necessary to address those natural resources and human activities that
are most difficult to organize and control. But it is important to keep
the problem in perspective. The sale of alcohol creates problems that
the sale of milk does not. The organization of water rights is far more
difficult than the organization of rights in land. In most situations the
standard set of contract and tort remedies do very well indeed, so that
there is no reason to deviate from a system that compensates for harm
inflicted and demands that persons who make serious promises keep
them. That these two principles account for so much of the law should
be treated as a source of both intellectual and social comfort, for it
means that most cases can be handled simply and directly.
There is a regrettable tendency today to deplore simple solutions
and to praise systems that seek to balance imponderables in broad ar-
eas of human behavior. Yet when it is recognized that complex systems
are costly to administer and that discretionary behavior gives scope to
opportunism and political intrigue, then the virtues of simple and har-
dier rules may be more appreciated. While some individual cases may
be hard, the theory is reasonably straightforward, for the goal is always
to reduce (to paraphrase Calabresi on accidents) the sum of costs at-
tributable to three sources: (a) the misconduct of actors, (b) the loss of
gains from proper conduct prevented or restricted, and (c) the adminis-
trative costs of the regulatory scheme. 41 So long as we keep the central
principle in mind, we can cope with the uncertainties of its application.
41. See G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970).
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